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THE DEFINITION OF INJURY UNDER THE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT: REVISITED
AND REDEFINED
Kraig Kazda
I. INTRODUCTION
An identifiable injury serves as the essential prerequisite to
any award of workers' compensation. Without such an injury, the
claimant may not receive workers' compensation benefits regard-
less of the circumstances. Compensation under the Montana
Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) also depends on fulfillment
of the definitional requirements of an identifiable injury as set
forth by the Act.1 This statutory definition of injury has not re-
mained static over time but has been revised by the legislature on
several occasions, most recently in 1987.
In order to understand the latest definition of injury, one must
first understand the past statutory definitions of injury and how
these varying definitions have been interpreted by the Montana
Supreme Court. This comment traces the development of the defi-
nition of injury under the Workers' Compensation Act beginning
with the first definition of injury in 1915 and culminating with the
latest definition of injury effective July 1, 1987. It then analyzes
the 1987 definition of injury and discusses the effects and implica-
tions of this new definition. Finally, it discusses the relationship
between the 1987 definition of injury under the Workers' Compen-
sation Act and the 1987 definition of occupational disease under
the Occupational Disease Act.
II. DEFINITIONAL HISTORY OF INJURY UNDER THE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT
The Montana Legislature adopted the first definition of injury
1. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119 (1987) states:
(1) "Injury" or "injured" means:
(a) internal or external physical harm to the body;
(b) damage to prosthetic devices or appliances, except for damage to eye-
glasses, contact lenses, dentures, or hearing aids; or
(c) death.
(2) An injury is caused by an accident. An accident is:
(a) an unexpected traumatic incident or unusual strain;
(b) identifiable by time and place of occurrence;
(c) identifiable by member or part of the body affected; and
(d) caused by a specific event on a single day or during a single work shift.
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in 1915.2 This initial definition, which remained unchanged until
1961, provided that "'[i]njury' or 'injured' refers only to an injury
resulting from some fortuitous event, as distinguished from the
contraction of disease." s Under this definition, the claimant only
needed to establish that the injury arose from a fortuitous
event.'In 1927, the Montana Supreme Court defined a "fortuitous
event" as a chance happening or accident "'occurring unexpect-
edly or without known cause'.., and therefore ... [the event] is
synonymous with 'industrial accident.'" Under this definition, if
either the cause or the effect was unexpected, a fortuitous event
had occurred." For example, in Rathbun v. Taber Tank Line, Inc.,7
the Montana Supreme Court held that a heart attack suffered by a
truck driver during a particularly stressful road trip was an unex-
pected result which constituted a fortuitous event, and thus a com-
pensable injury." The court stated:
It is enough, then, if there is an unexpected result, even though
there was no unexpected cause, such as a slip, fall or misstep, in
order to constitute an "accident" within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Law .... It is the unexpected and un-
intentional effect of the strain or exertion that is covered by the
Workmen's Compensation Law as an injury "by accident," and a
literal showing of an "accident" such as a slip, fall or misstep is
not a prerequisite to recovery."
In Murphy v. Anaconda,10 the Montana Supreme Court again held
that an unexpected result was sufficient to establish a compensable
injury. In Murphy, the claimant died from a pulmonary embolism
while working within the course and scope of his employment."
Yet, the attack in Murphy, unlike that in Rathbun, resulted from
the claimant's performance of his normal duties; no unusual strain
2. 1915 MONT. LAWS 96 § 6 (eventually codified at Revised Codes of Montana § 2870
(1921) [hereinafter R.C.M.]) (currently codified at MONT. CoDE ANN. § 39-71-119 (1987)).
3. See supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Murphy v. Anaconda, 133 Mont. 198, 206, 321 P.2d 1094, 1099 (1958);
Rathbun v. Taber Tank Line, Inc., 129 Mont. 121, 127, 283 P.2d 966, 969 (1955); Nicholson
v. Roundup Coal Mining Co., 79 Mont. 358, 374, 257 P. 270, 274 (1927).
5. Nicholson, 79 Mont. at 374, 257 P. at 274 (quoting in part from WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY).
6. Murphy, 133 Mont. at 207, 321 P.2d at 1099.
7. 129 Mont. 121, 283 P.2d 966 (1955).
8. Id. at 133, 283 P.2d at 972.
9. Id. at 131, 283 P.2d at 971 (quoting Gray v. Employers Mut. Liberty Ins. Co., 64 So.
2d 650, 651-52 (Fla. 1952) (emphasis in the original)).
10. 133 Mont. 198, 321 P.2d 1094 (1958).
11. Id. at 205, 321 P.2d at 1098.
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or stress preceded his attack.2 The Montana Supreme Court, how-
ever, held that an unexpected result received in the ordinary
course and scope of employment, even absent any unusual strain,
constituted a compensable injury under the Act."
Following Rathbun and Murphy, the 1961 legislature
amended the definition of compensable injury to specifically pre-
vent compensation for injuries received within the normal scope of
employment and without an unexpected cause. The definition of
injury, as amended, read in pertinent part as follows: "'Injury' or
'injured' means a tangible happening of a traumatic nature from
an unexpected cause resulting in either external or internal physi-
cal harm, and such physical condition as a result therefrom and
excluding disease not traceable to injury."1 This definitional
change from "fortuitous event" to "a tangible happening of a trau-
matic nature from an unexpected cause"'" prevented compensa-
tion for unexpected results. Subsequently, the Montana Supreme
Court began denying compensation to workers with injuries associ-
ated with an unexpected result but not an unexpected cause. 6 In
1964, the Montana Supreme Court heard Lupien v. Montana Rec-
ord Publishing Co.,' 7 the first case interpreting this new definition
of injury. Lupien, much like the claimant in Rathbun, suffered a
heart attack during the course and scope of his employment. 18 The
court, however, denied workers' compensation benefits to Lupien
since his injury involved an unexpected result but not an unex-
pected cause.' 9 The Montana Supreme Court reached the same de-
cision a year later in James v. VKV Lumber Co.20 In James, a lum-
ber stacker injured his back as he bent over to pick up a ten to
fifteen pound block of wood.2 The Montana Supreme Court held
that his back injury was not compensable under the Act because
the cause of the injury, the lifting of the wood, was a routinely
expected part of his job and thus not a "tangible happening of a
traumatic nature from an unexpected cause."22
In 1967, the legislature again amended the definition of injury
12. Id. at 201-02, 321 P.2d at 1096.
13. Id. at 211, 321 P.2d at 1101.
14. 1961 Mont. Laws 162, § 6 amending R.C.M. § 92-418 (1947) (emphasis added).
15. 1961 Mont. Laws 162, § 6 amending R.C.M. § 92-418 (1947) (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., James v. VKV Lumber Co., 145 Mont. 466, 401 P.2d 282 (1965); Lupien
v. Montana Record Publishing Co., 143 Mont. 415, 390 P.2d 455 (1964).
17. 143 Mont. 415, 390 P.2d 455 (1964).
18. Id. at 416, 390 P.2d at 456.
19. Id. at 419-20, 390 P.2d at 458.
20. 145 Mont. 466, 401 P.2d 282 (1965).
21. Id. at 467, 401 P.2d at 282.
22. Id. at 469, 401 P.2d at 283.
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by adding the phrase "or unusual strain. 2 3 While the change at
first glance seems insignificant, the impact was profound. The ad-
dition of this phrase abolished the unexpected cause requirement
and allowed an unexpected result arising from a work-related
strain, to once again become a compensable injury.24 Consequently,
the Montana Supreme Court in James v. Bair's Cafe 2 affirmed a
judgment awarding compensation to a dishwasher who injured her
back while picking up a heavy tray of dishes. The court reasoned
that the legislature added the phrase "or unusual strain" to make
this type of injury compensable, noting that: "[tlhere was no 'un-
expected cause' but there was an 'unusual strain'; thus the measure
would seem to be the result of a tangible happening of a traumatic
nature which results in physical harm, be it a rupture, a strain or a
sprain. ' '12
In Robins v. Ogle,2 7 the Montana Supreme Court again held
that an unexpected result gave rise to a compensable injury. In
Robins, the claimant injured her back when she lifted a mop
bucket full of water.2 8 The Montana Supreme Court, affirmed the
lower court's award of benefits, holding that the claimant's act of
incorrectly picking up the mop bucket and thereby injuring her
back constituted an unusual strain.2 9 The court stated:
"[a] tangible happening of an unexpected nature from an unusual
strain qualifies [as an injury], irrespective of whether the strain is
"unusual" from the standpoint of cause or effect. While it may be
arguable in the instant case whether the strain was unusual from
the standpoint of cause, it is clear that the effect here was un-
usual-herniation of an intervertebral disc resulting from picking
up the bucket in the wrong manner and turning to pick up the
mop. An unusual result from a work-related strain qualifies as
'an unusual strain .....
While the 1967 definition of injury again allowed for compen-
23. 1967 Mont. Laws 270 § 1 amending R.C.M. § 92-418 (1947) (currently codified at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119 (1987)). The amendment changed the definition of injury as
follows: "'Injury' or 'injured' means a tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an
unexpected cause or unusual strain resulting in either external or internal physical harm
and such physical condition as a result therefrom and excluding disease not traceable to the
injury." (emphasis added).
24. See e.g., Robins v. Ogle, 157 Mont. 328, 485 P.2d 692 (1971); Jones v. Bair's Cafe,
152 Mont. 13, 445 P.2d 923 (1968).
25. 152 Mont. 13, 445 P.2d 923 (1968).
26. Id. at 19, 445 P.2d at 926.
27. 157 Mont. 328, 485 P.2d 692 (1971).
28. Id. at 329, 485 P.2d at 693.
29. Id. at 332, 485 P.2d at 694.
30. Id. at 333, 485 P.2d at 695 (emphasis added).
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sation of an injury arising from an unexpected result, the defini-
tion did not eliminate the requirement of a "tangible happening of
a traumatic nature ... resulting in either external or internal phys-
ical harm. '3 ' Thus, in Erhart v. Great Western Sugar Co.,3 2 the
Montana Supreme Court denied compensation to a claimant who
suffered a mental and physical breakdown allegedly caused by
work related mental stress. The court ruled that the claimant
failed to demonstrate that the alleged mental stress constituted a
"tangible happening of a traumatic nature. 33 Similarly, in Stama-
tis v. Bechtel Power Corp.," the Montana Supreme Court denied
compensation benefits to a widow whose husband died of a heart
attack after cleaning some light fixtures.35 The court held that the
decedent's physical activities preceding the heart attack were not
unusual or strenuous. 6 Consequently, these activities did not con-
stitute "a tangible happening of a traumatic nature.., resulting in
[a] physical harm. '3 7
In Hoehne v. Granite Lumber Co.,38 the Montana Supreme
Court further concluded that a series of incidents, not merely a
single incident, could constitute a "tangible happening of a trau-
matic nature. '3 9 This inclusion of a "series of incidents," or "re-
peated traumas," 4 allowed for compensation of a multitude of in-
juries previously perceived as non-compensable. For example, in
Hoehne, the Montana Supreme Court held that bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome, resulting from a series of traumas incurred daily
over a two and one-half month period, when picking up and stack-
ing lumber, constituted a compensable injury.41 Similarly, in Jones
v. St. Regis Paper Co., 42 the Montana Supreme Court held that
claimant's aggravation of a pre-existing degenerative disc condition
by a series of micro traumas amounted to a compensable injury. 3
Finally, in Wise v. Perkins,'4 the Montana Supreme Court recog-
nized that thrombophlebitis caused by a series of small traumas
31. See supra note 2.
32. 169 Mont. 375, 546 P.2d 1055 (1976).
33. Id. at 381, 546 P.2d at 1058.
34. 184 Mont. 64, 601 P.2d 403 (1979).
35. Id. at 70, 601 P.2d at 406.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(1) (1979)).
38. 189 Mont. 221, 615 P.2d 863 (1980).
39. Id. at 225, 615 P.2d at 865.
40. I B, A. Larson, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 39.40 (1987).
41. Hoehne, 198 Mont. at 225, 615 P.2d at 865.
42. 196 Mont. 138, 639 P.2d 1140 (1981).
43. Id. at 149, 639 P.2d 1146.
44. 202 Mont. 157, 656 P.2d 816 (1983).
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associated with excessive work hours during a single week period
resulted in a compensable injury.""
III. THE 1987 DEFINITION OF INJURY: EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS
The 1987 legislature set out to reverse, by severely restricting
the definition of injury, what employers and insurers perceived as
the Montana Supreme Court's continual expansion of the defini-
tion of injury."6 The 1987 definition of injury as amended in sec-
tion 39-71-119 of the Montana Code Annotated provides as
follows:
(1) "Injury" or "injured" means:
(a) internal or external physical harm to the body;
(b) damage to prosthetic devices or appliances, except for
damage to eyeglasses, contact lenses, dentures, or hearing aids; or
(c) death.
(2) An injury is caused by an accident. An accident is:
(a) an unexpected traumatic incident or unusual strain;
(b) identifiable by time and place of occurrence;
(c) identifiable by member or part of the body affected; and
(d) caused by a specific event on a single day or during a
single work shift.
(3) "Injury" or "injured" does not mean a physical or mental
condition arising from:
(a) emotional or mental stress; or
(b) a nonphysical stimulus or activity.
(4) "Injury" or "injured" does not include a disease that is
not caused by an accident.
(5) A cardiovascular, pulmonary, respiratory, or other dis-
ease, cerebrovascular accident, or myocardial infarction suffered
by a worker is an injury only if the accident is the primary cause
of the physical harm in relation to other factors contributing to
the physical harm.' 7
Section 39-71-119 of the Montana Code Annotated specifically
excludes several types of conditions not previously expressly ex-
45. Id. at 165, 656 P.2d at 820.
46. Debate preceding enactment of the changes reflects this objective:
From previous testimony, Senator Gage feels case law has been given more
credence than statutes concerning the cases being settled in the courts. Senator
Gage feels everyone is under the opinion things have been too liberal concerning
case law. His concern at this point is to overcome the liberal decisions. There is a
need for an ultra-conservative statute in the law to off-set the liberalness of the
court cases.
See Hearing on S.B. 315 Before Labor and Employment Relations Subcommittee, 50th
Leg. 3-4 (Feb. 18, 1987) (comments of Senator Gage).
47. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119 (1987).
[Vol. 49
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cluded from the definition of injury, thereby expressly altering the
pre-1987 injury definition. Subsection three excludes those injurtes
arising from emotional or mental stress or non-physical stimulus or
activity;"8 subsection four excludes diseases not caused by an acci-
dent;"'9 and subsection five excludes cardiovascular, pulmonary, re-
spiratory, or other disease, cerebrovascular accident, or myocardial
infarction suffered by the worker.50 The definitional changes en-
tailed in subsection two also significantly alter the pre-1987 defini-
tion of injury. 1 Under subsection two, an injury must result from
an accident, which is a composite of four elements. All elements
must be present before an injury is compensable.52 The first ele-
ment, that the injury result from an unexpected traumatic incident
or unusual strain, is a continuation of the pre-1987 requirement
that the injury be the result of "a tangible happening of a trau-
matic nature from an unexpected cause or unusual strain. '' 53 To
establish a compensable injury, the claimant thus must continue to
meet the pre-1987 requirement that a tangible happening of a
traumatic nature cause the physical harm."'
The second element, that the accident be identifiable by body
part affected, simply reemphasizes the existing requirement that
the injury consist of either an internal or external physical harm to
the body.55 This element also requires that the claimant specify
the actual part of the body affected. The final two elements require
a claimant to identify the accident by time and place of occur-
rence56 and to prove that a specific event on a single day or during
a single work shift caused the injury.57 By limiting the accident to
a specific event identifiable by time and place on a single day or
during a single work shift, the Act will no longer cover many work-
ers suffering from injuries generally associated with repeated
trauma. 8
48. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(3) (1987).
49. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(4) (1987).
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(5) (1987). Note, however, that the injuries excluded
by subsection five are compensable if the claimant can demonstrate that a work-related
accident was the primary cause of the physical harm in relation to other factors contribut-
ing to the physical harm.
51. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(1) (1987) adds little to the pre-1987 definition of
injury, and thus the author has omitted any discussion of this subsection.
52. These four elements are not discussed in the order they appear in MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-71-119 (1987).
53. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(2)(a) (1987).
54. Hurlbut v. Vollstedt Kerr Co., 167 Mont. 303, 306-07, 538 P.2d 344, 346 (1975).
55. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(2)(c) (1987).
56. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(2)(b) (1987).
57. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(2)(d) (1987).
58. Examples of such conditions include carpal tunnel syndrome (see, e.g., Hoehne v.
19881
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Some claimants, however, may still argue that their particular
inlury, traditionally associated with repeated trauma, resulted in-
stead from a single traumatic incident. This argument will necessa-
rily depend on proving that despite the series of repeated traumas
received over time, the claimant was asymptomatic until the inci-
dence of a single event. Bre mer v. Buerkle59 provides support for
this position. In Bremer, the claimant, an autobody repairman ex-
posed to various chemicals for nine years, suddenly developed an
allergic reaction (allergic contact dermatitis) to those same chemi-
cals.60 The claimant successfully argued that his injury resulted
from a single exposure that stimulated his immune system and led
to the allergic reaction and not from the cumulative impact of the
repeated exposures.6 1 Similarly, a claimant suffering from carpal
tunnel syndrome could successfully argue that he was asymptom-
atic, despite being exposed to a series of micro traumas tradition-
ally thought to cause carpal tunnel syndrome, until a specific event
on a single day triggered the condition.
Alternatively, a claimant could successfully argue that the
very last trauma in a series of gradually debilitating traumas was
sufficient to meet the specific event requirement. The Montana Su-
preme Court recognized the validity of this argument in Love v.
Ralph's Food Store, Inc.6 2 In Love, the claimant filed a claim for
workers' compensation claiming an accidental injury to her lower
back that she described as caused "by continuously lifting some-
thing heavy."63 Despite the evidence of a gradual build-up of back
pain over an extended period of time, the Montana Supreme Court
held that the claimant suffered a compensable injury since she was
able to identify two specific incidents, each occurring on a single
workday or shift, in which she strained her back. 4
IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
AND THE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT
Although the 1987 legislature amended the definition of injury
under the Workers' Compensation Act to restrict the coverage of
repetitive trauma injuries, it broadened the definition of occupa-
Granite Lumber Co., 189 Mont. 221, 615 P.2d 863 (1980)); herniated disc (see, e.g., Lemoine
v. Marksville Indus., Inc., 391 So.2d 528 (La. App. 1981)); and dermatitis (see, e.g., Christo-
pher v. City Grill, 218 Miss. 638, 67 So.2d 694 (1953)).
59. - Mont. -, 727 P.2d 529 (1986).
60. Id. at __, 727 P.2d at 530.
61. Id. at _, 727 P.2d at 532-33.
62. 163 Mont. 234, 516 P.2d 598 (1973).
63. Id. at 236, 516 P.2d at 599.
64. Id. at 241-43, 516 P.2d at 601-03.
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tional disease so that now the Occupational Disease Act provides
coverage for such injuries. The amended definition of occupational
disease as set forth in Montana Code Annotated section 39-72-
102(10) provides as follows:
"Occupational disease" means harm, damage, or death as set
forth in 39-71-119(1) arising out of or contracted in the course
and scope of employment caused by events occurring on more
than a single day or work shift. The term does not include a phys-
ical or mental condition arising from emotional or mental stress
or from a nonphysical stimulus or activity.6 5
By shifting coverage for repeated trauma injuries from the
Workers' Compensation Act to the Occupational Disease Act, em-
ployers and insurers will pay less compensation to injured workers.
Under the Occupational Disease Act an injured worker is entitled
only to benefits for temporary total and permanent total disabil-
ity.6 No benefits are payable for partial disability. 7 Additionally,
if a non-compensable disease or infirmity causes or aggravates an
occupational disease, the benefits payable to the claimant are re-
duced on a proportionate basis.6
The Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational Dis-
ease Act both provide that an injured worker may elect compensa-
tion under either Act, but the elected compensation is then the
exclusive remedy available to the worker.69 Injured workers who
fail to qualify for coverage under either the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act or the Occupational Disease Act, however, may seek com-
pensation from employers under the common law. Such common-
law suits against employers should dramatically increase given the
restricted definition of injury, and thus coverage under the Work-
ers' Compensation Act.
The success of such common-law suits will depend upon proof
that the negligence of the employer proximately caused the in-
jury.70 Further, the employer can assert any of the traditional com-
mon-law defenses, including any alleged contributory negligence by
the employee.7 1 The burden of proof required of an injured worker
65. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-102(10) (1987).
66. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-701 (1987).
67. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-703 (1987).
68. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-706 (1987).
69. See MoNT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-411 (1987); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-305 (1987).
See also Ridenour v. Equity Supply Co., 204 Mont. 473, 665 P.2d 783 (1983) (holding that
claimants may choose to seek compensation under either Act if they meet the requirements
of both Acts).
70. Kern v. Payne, 65 Mont. 325, 330-31, 211 P. 767, 769 (1922).
71. See generally MoNT. R. Civ. P. 8(c); Green v. Hagele, 182 Mont. 155, 595 P.2d 1159
1988]
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seeking compensation under the common law, however, will not be
insurmountable given the legislature's promulgation of the "Mon-
tana Safe Place to Work Statute" that requires employers to pro-
vide their employees with a safe place to work.72 Other jurisdic-
tions by statuti and common law similarly have required
employers to provide employees with a safe place to work. For ex-
ample, in Hines v. Continental Baking Co., 73 the injured employee
first sought workers' compensation for a back injury allegedly in-
curred while he was jerking a bread cart over a rough spot on the
floor.7 " The Industrial Commission denied the claim holding that
the employee did not suffer a compensable injury as defined by the
Act.75 The employee then brought a common-law personal injury
action, alleging the employer's failure to exercise reasonable care in
furnishing a safe place to work. The court of appeals upheld the
judgment in favor of the employee. The court found that the em-
ployer's failure to exercise reasonable care in furnishing a safe
place to work constituted negligence for which the employer was
liable, regardless of whether or not the employer had actual knowl-
edge of the defect making the premises unsafe. 6 Similarly, in
Samson v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Corp.,77 the
Court of Appeals of Louisiana held that the claimant's mental
breakdown precipitated solely by the stress of his employment did
not constitute an injury within the meaning of the Louisiana
Workmens' Compensation Act.78  Consequently, the claimant
brought suit against his employer under the common law alleging a
tortious failure to provide the employee with a safe place to work.79
The Montana Supreme Court has yet to face a factual situation
similar to Hines or Samson. The court, however, has held that an
employee's contributory negligence will not act as an absolute bar
to recovery under the common law if the employee has no alterna-
(1979); Gilleard v. Draine, 159 Mont. 167, 496 P.2d 83 (1972); Dahlin v. Rice Truck Lines,
137 Mont. 430, 352 P.2d 801 (1960).
72. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-71-201 (1987) provides:
Every employer shall furnish a place of employment which is safe for employees
therein and shall furnish and use and require the use of such safety devices and
safeguards and shall adopt and use such practices, means, methods, operations,
and processes as are reasonably adequate to render the place of employment safe
and shall do every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life and safety
of employees.
73. 334 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
74. Id. at -, 334 S.W.2d at 142-43.
75. Id. at __, 334 S.W.2d at 142.
76. Id. at __, 334 S.W.2d at 146-47.
77. 205 So. 2d 496 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
78. Id. 205 So. 2d at 500.
79. Id. 205 So. 2d at 500-03.
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tive, short of discontinuing his employment, but to work in an un-
safe environment.80
V. CONCLUSION
The 1987 amended definition of injury under the Workers'
Compensation Act, to the detriment of injured workers, excludes
physical and mental conditions arising from emotional or mental
stress or non-physical stimulus or activity from coverage under the
Act."' Additionally, the amended definition of injury excludes con-
ditions caused not by an accident,82 but by a cardiovascular, pul-
monary, respiratory, or other disease.83 Further, the new restrictive
requirement that an accident result from a specific event on a sin-
gle day appears to prevent coverage of injuries traditionally result-
ing from repetitive traumas.
The statute, however, may not be the complete panacea that
the legislature intended. At least two arguments remain for includ-
ing conditions traditionally associated with repeated trauma within
the definition of injury. More importantly, the statute, by restrict-
ing coverage of a large number of injuries, invites injured workers
to pursue personal injury litigation under the common law and the
Montana Safe Place to Work statutes, with employers ultimately
bearing the enormous expense of such successful common-law
suits.
80. Shannon v. Howard S. Wright Construction Corp., 181 Mont. 269, 275, 593 P.2d
438, 441 (1979). This action arose prior to the adoption of Montana's Comparative Negli-
gence Statute, MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1987). However, there is no reason to believe
the exception created by the Montana Supreme Court would not hold true today if the
lower court found the plaintiff 51% negligent and thereby completely barred from recovery
under MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1987).
81. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(3) (1987).
82. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(4) (1987).
83. See supra note 50 (cerebrovascular accidents and myocardial infarctions are also
specifically excluded from coverage).
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